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ARE WE EXECUTING MENTALLY INCOMPETENT
INMATES BECAUSE THEY VOLUNTEER TO DIE?:
A LOOK AT VARIOUS STATES' IMPLEMENTATION
OF STANDARDS OF COMPETENCY TO WAIVE
POST-CONVICTION REVIEW
Paula Shapiro'
More then half of all prison and jail inmates have mental health
problems.! Since the death penalty was reinstated in 1976,2 123 death-
row inmates, many of whom suffered from various mental conditions,3
were executed after they decided to waive their right to post-conviction
review of their sentences.4 Within the legal community, these death-row
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1. DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 1
(2006). According to a Bureau Justice Statistics study released September 6, 2006, 56% of
state prisoners, 45% of federal prisoners, 64% of local jail inmates have mental health
problems. Id. at 165. The study was based on reporting of symptoms by inmates rather
than through medical diagnosis. Id. Among state prisoners with mental problems, 43%
had symptoms of mania, 23% had major depression, and 15% had psychotic disorders. Id.
Having mental health problems was closely correlated with violence and past criminal
activity. See id. at 7.
Other significant findings regarding those prisoners with mental problems included:
74% of those in state prison were dependent on or abusing drugs or alcohol in the year
before their admission; 13% of those in state prison were homeless in the year before their
incarceration; and 27% of those in state prison reported past physical or sexual abuse. Id.
2. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion) (holding that executing
offenders as punishment for the crime of murder does not violate the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments in every circumstance). Four years earlier, the Supreme Court
had ruled that the death penalty as it existed at the time was unconstitutional. See Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam).
3. John H. Blume, Killing the Willing: "Volunteers," Suicide and Competency, 103
MICH. L. REV. 939, apps. A-B (2005) (listing ninety-three volunteers who were executed
between 1973 and 2003, along with their known mental illnesses and/or substance abuse
disorders). Every one of the ninety-three volunteers had at least one mental illness or
substance abuse disorder. See id.
4. Death Penalty Information Center, Searchable Database of Executions,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions.php (follow "volunteers" under "special
factors") (last visited Oct. 15, 2007). Many of these 123 volunteers waived other
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inmates are commonly referred to as "volunteers," because they
voluntarily choose not to initiate or continue post-conviction
proceedings, and allow or even request execution The prevalence of
mental incompetence in the criminal justice system, coupled with this
volunteer phenomenon,6 presents a serious problem for states in ensuring
that inmates who voluntarily choose to forego their post-conviction
review are mentally competent not only to waive such review, but also to
be executed. In order to prevent the execution of inmates who are
mentally incompetent, states are being forced to adopt their own
standards and guidelines to determine a volunteer's competency to waive
post-conviction relief.'
Twenty years ago, the United States Supreme Court, in Ford v.
Wainwright, held that the Eighth Amendment's bar against cruel and
unusual punishment precludes the execution of insane or incompetent
inmates.' Ford gave wide discretion to the states to define the
procedural protections as well, such as the right to counsel and the right to presentation of
mitigating evidence. Id.; see also Blume, supra note 3, 940 n.5.
5. Blume, supra note 3, at 940 n.5. The term "volunteer" also includes death-row
inmates who refuse to allow their counsel to provide mitigating evidence at trial, who take
affirmative steps to waive their appeals but later decide to re-initiate with post-conviction
proceedings, and who simply consider the possibility of abandoning appeals. Id.
6. The term phenomenon refers to the fact that seventy-four of the 123 volunteer
executions have occurred within the past ten-year period (1997-2006). See Death Penalty
Information Center, Searchable Database of Executions, supra note 4.
7. See, e.g., State v. Dawson, 133 P.3d 236, 243 (Mont. 2006) (adopting, for the first
time, a standard of competency to waive post-conviction review); see also infra notes 99,
100, and 103 and accompanying text.
8. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986). Commentators have used the
term "insane" and "incompetent" interchangeably to describe those inmates protected by
Ford. See John L. Farringer IV, Note, The Competency Conundrum: Problems Courts
Have Faced in Applying Different Standards for Competency to Be Executed, 54 VAND. L.
REV. 2441, 2483 n.326 (2001) ("A dictionary of psychology defines 'incompetence' as
'lacking the necessary ability or qualification properly to carry out a task,' and state[s] that
'[i]n psychiatric literature, incompetence refers to a state characteristic of insane or
mentally deficient persons who, because of their deficiency, are not legally responsible.' It
also defines 'insanity' as 'a serious mental disorder that renders the individual incapable of
conducting his affairs in a competent manner,' and states that '[i]nsanity is a legal, not a
psychological term."' (quoting J.P. CHAPLIN, DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY 224, 231 (2d
ed. 1985))). Given the court system's and mental health experts' frequent use of the terms
"competency to be executed" or "competency determinations," the author of this
Comment uses the term "competency" to refer to the mental standard that volunteers
must meet in order to legally waive their rights to post-conviction relief. The term
"mental illness" or "mentally ill" is used to refer to "[a]ny of various psychiatric
conditions, usually characterized by impairment of an individual's normal cognitive,
emotional, or behavioral functioning, and caused by physiological or psychosocial factors."
Medical Dictionary, Definition of Mental Illness, http://medical-dictionary.
thefreedictionary.com/mental+illness (quoting THE AMERICAN HERITAGE STEDMAN'S
[Vol. 57:567
2008] Are Mentally Incompetent Inmates Volunteering to Die? 569
competency threshold for execution and to develop the necessary
procedures for competency determinations.9 Since Ford, "[e]very state
that imposes the death penalty prohibits the execution of the mentally
incompetent,"'0 but Ford's lack of structural guidance for procedures in
competency determinations has resulted in numerous variations among
states." Uncertainty as to how to safeguard mentally incompetent
prisoners from execution has led to a multitude of proposals for uniform
regulations and laws suggesting competency determination procedures. 2
The Eighth Amendment's constitutional prohibition against executing
the mentally incompetent, as recognized in Ford, demands that a
competency determination occur before the execution of any death-row
inmate who waives his post-conviction appeals and volunteers to be
executed.13 States and courts have struggled to determine whether the
standard of competency to waive an appeal should be identical to theS 14
competency standard for execution. Similar to states' differing
standards of competency to be executed, standards for determining
inmate competency to waive the right to post-conviction appeals have
also developed differently across the states since the first volunteer case
in recent history, Rees v. Peyton.5 The lack of uniform and specific
standards, combined with various ethical and moral issues that
MEDICAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 2007)). The term "mental illness" is synonymous with
"mental disease" or "mental disorder." Id.
9. Ford, 477 U.S. at 427 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
10. Bruce Ebert, Competency to Be Executed: A Proposed Instrument to Evaluate an
Inmate's Level of Competency in Light of the Eighth Amendment Prohibition Against the
Execution of the Presently Insane, 25 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 29, 35 (2001).
11. See generally Gordon L. Moore III, Comment, Ford v. Wainwright: A Coda in the
Executioner's Song, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1461 (1987) (analyzing Ford's lack of standards for
minimum due process requirements in state procedures for determining insanity, and
arguing for stricter standards to back up Ford's basic requirements).
12. E.g., Blume, supra note 3, at 948-54 (discussing the "[d]ebate over
[v]olunteering"); Ebert, supra note 10, at 35 (reciting the ABA incompetency for
execution standard); Matthew T. Norman, Note, Standards and Procedures for
Determining Whether a Defendant is Competent to Make The Ultimate Choice-Death;
Ohio's New Precedent for Death Row "Volunteers", 13 J.L. & HEALTH 103, 119-30 (1998-
1999) (reviewing various court and state competency standards).
13. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 152-53, 165-66 (1990); Ford, 477 U.S. at
410-11 (plurality opinion); Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1013 n.1, 1015 & n.5 (1976)
(Burger, C.J., concurring); Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 313-14 (1966) (per curiam).
14. See, e.g., State v. Dawson, 133 P.3d 236, 243 (Mont. 2006) (adopting a version of
the Rees competency-to-waive standard, which differed from the state's competency-to-
be-executed standard); Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d 53, 58 (S.C. 1993) (adopting the
competency-to-be-executed standard as the competency-to-waive standard).
15. 384 U.S. 312 (1966).
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accompany an inmate's request to die,'6 creates gaps in the system that
increase the chance that a mentally incompetent inmate will be executed
unlawfully.'7
Putting aside the issue of the possible inadequacy of states' standards
to determine competency to be executed and competency to waive
appeals,8 this Comment examines four states' adoption and
implementation of procedures for determining an inmate's competency
to waive his state post-conviction review. This Comment focuses on the
four states in which a volunteer was executed in 2006-Montana,
Nevada, Ohio, and South Carolina' 9-and analyzes the procedures used
16. The volunteer phenomenon has raised a number of questions that have plagued
scholars since the Rees decision in 1966. Scholars have debated the ethical and moral
problems regarding the responsibilities of lawyers who represent death-row volunteers,
the inability of courts to create a thorough competency standard that encompasses
sufficient procedural safeguards, and the possible mental illness or suicidal motivations
underlying the decision among some death-row inmates to choose execution. See Blume,
supra note 3, at 942; Ebert, supra note 10, at 31-32 (arguing that the competency-to-be-
executed standard is inadequate and offering a proposed instrument as a solution);
Richard W. Garnett, Sectarian Reflections on Lawyers' Ethics and Death Row Volunteers,
77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 795, 798 & n.15 (2002) (citing articles).
17. For example, in North Carolina, Guy LeGrande was scheduled to be executed on
December 1, 2006. Death Penalty Information Center, Clemency Urged for Mentally Ill
Man in North Carolina, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=1938 (last visited
Oct. 26, 2007). LeGrande, a severely mentally ill man, was allowed to "represent" himself
at trial and to waive state post-conviction proceedings,
despite the fact that he claimed to be hearing messages from Oprah Winfrey and
Dan Rather through television sets. His defense lawyer, Jay Ferguson, said
LeGrande falsely believes he has already been pardoned and will receive a large
sum of money. "The problem is you have a mentally ill person representing
himself," Ferguson said. "When his standby counsel asked the court to review
his mental competency, the judge asked the defendant if he wanted to do that
and he said no. His response was to tear up the paperwork. So you've got a
mentally ill defendant making the call on whether his competency should be
examined."
Id. LeGrande has recently been diagnosed with a delusional disorder with grandiose and
persecutory delusions. See LeGrande v. Lee, No. 1:99CV00314, 2005 WL 1869223, at *7-
10 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 5, 2005). As of March 2008, LeGrande has not been executed and
legal wrangling about the definition of competency and mental illness continues. This case
illustrates the need for uniform requirements in volunteer cases to protect against an
incompetent or mentally ill inmate making legal decisions that a neutral court should be
determining.
18. A discussion of the insufficiencies within the legal definition of competency is
beyond the scope of this Comment.
19. Dawson, 133 P.3d at 243 (adopting a standard of competency to waive post-
conviction review and finding that David Dawson was competent based on that standard);
Mack v. State, 75 P.3d 803, 804 (Nev. 2003) (per curiam) (finding Darryl Linnie Mack
competent to waive post-conviction review); State v. Ferguson, 844 N.E.2d 806, 817 (Ohio
2006) (finding that based on testing prior to and during trial, Darrell W. Ferguson was
competent to waive post-conviction review and be executed); State v. Barton, 844 N.E.2d
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to determine whether the volunteer met each state's standard of
competency to waive prior to execution. 0 This Comment further
examines the state appeal procedures used to determine whether the
state courts based such decisions on non-arbitrary and sufficient
evidence. Twenty years after the Ford Court held that certain due
process safeguards are required before the execution of possibly
incompetent death-row inmates,2' questions and problems still remain.
307, 317 (Ohio 2006) (holding that Rocky Barton did not show an indicia of incompetency
to waive post-conviction review, and was competent to waive and be executed); State v.
Downs, 631 S.E.2d 79, 80-81 (S.C. 2006) (holding that under the Singleton standard
William E. Downs, Jr. was competent to waive his post-conviction review).
20. However, a look at the courts' implementation of competency determinations in
2006 cases where the courts have stayed a "volunteer's" execution is beyond the scope of
this Comment.
The two 2006 volunteers for whom the courts have decided to stay executions are Daryl
Keith Holton and Elijah Page. For information on Holton, see Holton v. State, 201
S.W.3d 626 (Tenn. 2006); Holton v. Bell, No. 1:05-cv-202, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67992
(E.D. Tenn. Sept. 21, 2006). For information on Page, see State v. Page, 709 N.W.2d 739
(S.D. 2006). For a recent look at Florida's implementation of competency determinations,
see L. Elizabeth Chamblee, Comment, Time for a Legislative Change: Florida's Stagnant
Standard Governing Competency for Execution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 335 (2004).
21. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411-12 (1986) (plurality opinion); see also infra
notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (ADEPA), even
after a state court has issued a "final" decision on the competency of an inmate to waive
his or her post-conviction appeals or to be executed, a federal district court is required to
hold an additional evidentiary hearing on competency if the sufficiency of the state court
proceedings, under a presumption of correctness, do not meet specific factors set forth in
the statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (2000) (stating that "a determination of a factual
issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct"). ADEPA actually
heightened the requirement for federal habeas review of state court determinations,
making this safeguard less effective. See, e.g., Symposium, The Death Penalty Experiment:
The Facts Behind the Conclusions, 29 U. DAYTON L. REV. 223, 228 (2004) ("[The
ADEPA] heightened many of the requirements for filing and granting federal habeas
corpus petitions. Specifically, the Act mandates that habeas claims must be denied unless
the state court unreasonably applied federal law. Therefore, the Act will likely decrease
the number of overturned death sentences." (footnotes omitted)).
The statutory safeguard of federal review of state court habeas corpus determinations
arguably reduces the probability that incompetent inmates will be executed. The
existence of additional safeguards, including federal review, between the state supreme
court's determination of competency to waive post-conviction review and the actual
execution of the "volunteer" does not, however, render the state procedures sufficient to
capture incompetence. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400-01 (1993) (explaining that
federal habeas corpus was not intended to correct errors at the state level). It is not an
excuse for states not to fix their relevant laws or systems simply because the federal courts
will inspect the decisions. See id. One argument in favor of states disregarding federal
government checks is that it is a waste of money and resources, not to mention unfair to
the inmate who is forced to go through an additional appeal process while awaiting
execution. However, states should not have an inferior process of ensuring that
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Part I of this Comment presents the developments leading up to the
current case law regarding the execution of incompetent inmates. A
review of the Supreme Court's identification of due process problems in
Ford, and of psychiatric evaluation problems in the 2002 case Atkins v.
22Virginia, illuminates the Court's approach to the competency
determination of volunteers. Part I then examines the four states'
standards of competency to waive post-conviction review and the
procedural requirements in place to make such determinations. Finally,
Part I identifies the five 2006 volunteer executions and briefly recounts
the factual and procedural history of the cases.
In light of these states' standards and procedures, and based on legal
literature proposing model legislation or instruments to determine
competency, Part II first suggests five basic procedural requirements that
should be uniformly adopted by all states in order to ensure the
adequacy of standards used to determine competency to waive post-
conviction review. Part II then examines the 2006 volunteer executions
to determine whether the states implemented these five basic
requirements to ensure that incompetent inmates are not being executed
because they volunteer to die.
Part III discusses the discrepancies affecting the states' implementation
of standards to evaluate competency to waive post-conviction
proceedings, and also highlights some states that have implemented
standards and procedures that seem to effectively safeguard an
incompetent inmate's interests. Part III then addresses the reasons why
lack of uniformity in state determinations of competency to waive post-
conviction review increases the likelihood that the incompetent will be
executed. Part III concludes that explicit requirements delineating
specific procedures for waiving post-conviction review and determining
competency to waive must be adopted and implemented in order to
safeguard the incompetent inmate's rights.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF CURRENT STANDARDS TO DETERMINE DEATH-
Row INMATES' COMPETENCY TO WAIVE POST-CONVICTION APPEALS
A. The Historical Context of Capital Punishment and Incompetence
In the 1986 case Ford v. Wainwright, the Supreme Court held that
executing a mentally incompetent inmate was constitutionally
incompetent individuals are not being executed just because there is an additional federal
protection in place; state executions should include sufficient state procedures. See id.
22. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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impermissible.2 In an expansive reading of the Constitution, the Court
held that the execution of the incompetent constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment as prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.24 A plurality of the
Ford Court further addressed the limited issue of whether Florida's
statutory procedures to determine an inmate's competency to be
executed violated a defendant's procedural due process rights. 2 The
plurality identified three baseline requirements that must be conducted
in all cases for the procedures determining competency to be executed.
First, at a minimum, the condemned or his counsel must be allowed to
present relevant material so the fact-finder can make an informed
decision.6 Second, the condemned or his counsel must be allowed the
"opportunity to challenge or impeach the state-appointed psychiatrists'
opinions." 27 Third, in order for the determination to be reliable, the final
decision must not be left solely to the executive branch.2 However,
rather than specify the procedures necessary for a complete
determination, the Court simply noted the deficiencies in Florida's
procedures,29 leaving to the states "the task of developing appropriate
ways to enforce the constitutional restriction" on executing incompetent
•30
inmates and to meet the aforementioned basic requirements.
Although the Court did not address the sufficiency of Florida's
definition of competency, Justice Powell discussed it in his concurring
23. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 401 (observing that although all jurisdictions have forbidden
the execution of the insane for centuries, the Supreme Court had yet to specifically
prohibit the practice).
24. See id. at 409-10.
25. Id. at 410-11.
26. Id. at 414.
27. Id. at 415.
28. Id. at 416.
29. Id. The plurality found that one defect in Florida's procedures was the "failure to
include the prisoner in the truth-seeking process." Id. at 413. Any procedure that
precludes the prisoner or his or her counsel from presenting material relevant to his or her
sanity, or bars consideration of that material, deprives the factfinder of "the substantial
benefit of potentially probative information." See id. at 414. Another procedural
deficiency was "the denial of any opportunity to challenge or impeach the state-appointed
psychiatrists' opinions," which "create[d] a significant possibility that the ultimate decision
made in reliance on those experts will be distorted." Id. at 415. Arguably, "the most
striking defect" in the Florida procedure was that the executive branch had the sole
decision-making power. Id. at 416. It is the Governor "who appoints the experts and
ultimately decides whether the State will be able to carry out the [death] sentence ....
[and] whose subordinates have been responsible for initiating every stage of the
prosecution .... The [Governor] cannot be said to have the neutrality that is necessary
for reliability in the factfinding proceedings." Id.
30. Id. at 416-17; see also id. at 427 (Powell, J., concurring) (arguing that, aside from
basic due process requirements, "[s]tates should have substantial leeway to determine
what process best balances the various interests at stake").
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opinion." His widely-accepted concurrence created a low constitutional
threshold to be used in determining whether a death-row inmate is
competent to be executed.32 In Justice Powell's view, "the Eighth
Amendment forbids the execution only of those who are unaware of the
punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it."33 For
the states to create procedures to meet this standard, Justice Powell
suggested that the majority's "heightened procedural requirements" are
unnecessary for a determination of competency to be executed. 34 In fact,
he indicated that all that is needed to ensure due process is a hearing "far
less formal than a trial," conducted by an impartial state officer or board
that would hear and receive both prosecution and defense evidence.35
Such evidence, according to Justice Powell, could include expert
psychiatric testimony from both the state and defense, as well as
36
argument from prisoner's counsel. Ultimately, the Court agreed on the
inapplicability of the major justifications for capital punishment where
incompetent inmates are concerned, such as its deterrent and retributive
forces, because in order to be effective, those justifications require
inmates' "awareness of the penalty's existence and purpose."" As a
result, the Court found that the execution of the mentally incompetent
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.38
In light of the constitutional prohibition against executing the mentally
incompetent, the Supreme Court in 1989 held that the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition did not categorically exclude the execution of
criminals with mental retardation. 39 However in 2002 the Court reversed
31. Id. at 421-22 (Powell, J., concurring).
32. Donald P. Judges, The Role of Mental Health Professionals in Capital
Punishment. An Exercise in Moral Disengagement, 41 HOUs. L. REV. 515, 534 (2004)
(discussing Justice Powell's concurrence that gave the majority the necessary fifth vote for
its decision in Ford); see, e.g., Johnson v. Cabana, 818 F.2d 333, 337 (5th Cir. 1987) (per
curiam) (adopting Justice Powell's standard as the constitutional minimum).
33. Ford, 477 U.S. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 425 (explaining that a "full-scale 'sanity trial' is unnecessary in light of the
flexibility of the due process doctrine, and that the necessary requirements will depend on
the situation).
35. Id. at 427.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 421 (discussing the lack of retributive value to executing the insane).
38. Id. at 407-08 (Marshall, J.); id. at 421 (Powell, J., concurring).
39. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989). In this case, Johnny Paul Penry, a
twenty-two year old retarded man with the mental age of a six and one-half year old, was
convicted of murder and sentenced to death. Id. at 307-08. Penry was found competent to
stand trial based partly on the testimony of two state psychiatrists who diagnosed Penry
with an antisocial personality disorder. Id. at 308-09. During the trial proceedings, the
jury was not instructed that it could consider the mitigating circumstances of Penry's
[Vol. 57:567
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its position on mental retardation and held, six to three in Atkins v.
Virginia, that the application of the death penalty to defendants with
mental retardation is per se unconstitutional.4°  The Atkins Court
reasoned that although mentally retarded persons may know the
difference between right and wrong and may seem competent to stand
trial, they have diminished abilities in reasoning, judgment, and impulse
control.4' Accordingly, the Court found that these persons are less
culpable. ' These same characteristics apply to incompetent inmates.
In Atkins, the Court once again offered states minimal guidance
regarding specific procedures that should be used to determine mental
competency in order to prevent the unconstitutional execution of
mentally retarded offenders.i The Court did, however, demonstrate the
contrast between the thoroughness of the state and defense experts'
competency evaluations.4 ' The defense's forensic psychologist, who
testified that Atkins was "mildly mentally retarded," interviewed Atkins,
mental retardation in imposing its sentence. Id. at 307. In an opinion determining
whether Penry's sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment, Justice O'Connor
argued that the jury was improperly instructed and should have been able to consider
Penry's mental deficiencies when imposing its sentence. Id. at 303, 340. However, she
rejected Penry's blanket claim that generally the Eighth Amendment does not allow death
sentences for retarded defendants. See id. at 340.
40. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
41. Id. at 318 (noting that mentally retarded persons "have diminished capacities to
understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn
from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the
reactions of others").
42. Id. at 318. The Atkins Court also found, similar to the Ford Court, that this lesser
culpability effectively eliminates the applicability of the retributive and deterrent purposes
justifying capital punishment and creating an increasing likelihood of "wrongful
execution." See id. at 318-21 (reasoning that mentally retarded defendants "face a special
risk of wrongful execution" because they "may be less able to give meaningful assistance
to their counsel and are typically poor witnesses, and their demeanor may create an
unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their crimes"). Another reason the Court
retreated from Penry was because of the prevalence nationwide of legislation prohibiting
such executions and the infrequency of the executions in states that allow mentally
retarded offenders to be executed. Id. at 314-16. The Court also noted that polling data
showed that the world community and many Americans were against executions of
mentally retarded offenders. Id. at 316 n.21. Finally, the Court found persuasive that the
mentally retarded are more likely to make false confessions and less likely to convince a
jury that it should consider mitigating factors. See id. at 320-21.
43. Compare id. at 320, with Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 314 (1966) (per curiam)
(explaining that if an inmate fails to understand information about his position, or lacks
"capacity to appreciate his position," then he should be found incompetent).
44. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 ("As was our approach in Ford v. Wainwright, with regard
to insanity, 'we leave to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the
constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences."' (quoting Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416-17 (1986)) (internal citation omitted)).
45. Id. at 308-09.
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members of his family, and deputies at the jail where Atkins had been
incarcerated for eighteen months prior. He also reviewed school, court,
and investigative records, including Atkins' statements to police, and
administered a standard intelligence test, which indicated Atkins' IQ was
59."6 In contrast, the states' expert, who determined that Atkins was not
mentally retarded and testified that Atkins had an antisocial personality
disorder with an "'average intelligence, at least,"' based his testimony on
a much less thorough evaluation.47 His testimony was based only upon
"two interviews with Atkins, a review of his school records, and
interviews with correctional staff., 48  Although specifically relating to
mental retardation and making virtually no mention of standards of
competency to be executed or waive appeals, this reasoning provides
insight into the Court's attitude toward mental evaluations generally.
B. The Development of the Standards of Competency to Waive
Post-Conviction Appeals
Ford and Atkins only provide an indication as to what the Supreme
Court considers important in terms of the evaluations and standards for
competency to waive post-conviction appeals. The following cases,
however, offer concrete evidence of the Court's jurisprudence in the area
of inmate competency to waive post-conviction relief and volunteer for
execution.
In 1966, in Rees v. Peyton, defendant Melvin Davis Rees, Jr. sought to
withdraw his post-conviction appeal.4 9  After Rees' counsel offered
evidence and presented the testimony of a psychiatrist who concluded
that Rees was mentally incompetent, the Supreme Court ordered a
judicial competency evaluation of Rees5 ° The Court instructed the lower
court to determine whether the prisoner had the "capacity to appreciate
46. Id. at 308-09 & n.4. Dr. Nelson, the defense psychologist, administered the
United States' standard intellectual functioning assessment, the Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scales test (WAS-Ill), which scores from 45-155. Id. at 309 n.5. A score of
100 is considered average cognitive functioning, whereas a score between 70 and 75 is
considered the cutoff for a finding of mental retardation. Id.
47. Id. at 309 & n.6.
48. Id.
49. Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 313 (1966) (per curiam). Rees was sentenced to
death for murder by a Virginia state court in 1961, and his sentence was affirmed on
appeal in 1962. Id. at 312-13. A month after petitioning the Supreme Court for certiorari,
Rees directed his attorney to withdraw the petition and waive his remaining appeals. Id.
at 313. Rees' attorney told the Court "he could not conscientiously accede to these
instructions without a psychiatric evaluation of Rees because evidence cast doubt on Rees'
mental competency," and after further conversations among Rees, his attorney, and the
Court, Rees' attorney had him evaluated by a psychiatrist who concluded that Rees was
indeed mentally incompetent. Id.
50. Id. at 313-14.
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his position and make a rational choice with respect to continuing or
abandoning further litigation," or "whether he [wa]s suffering from a
mental disease, disorder, or defect which may substantially affect his
capacity in the premises."51
Following Rees, courts had trouble applying this two-prong test 2 For
this reason, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in
Rumbaugh v. Procunier, modified the Rees standard into a three-part
competence inquiry.5 First, the court asked, does the condemned have a
mental disorder? Next, if the condemned is suffering from a mental
disorder or defect, does this condition prevent him from understanding
his legal position and his available options? Finally, if the condemned is
suffering from a mental disorder but his understanding is unimpaired,
does the condition nonetheless prevent the condemned from rationally
choosing among his options?
54
In Rumbaugh, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision of the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Texas to deny a "next
friend" petition55 on behalf of volunteer Charles Rumbaugh, where the
district court determined that he possessed the requisite mental
competence to waive his right to post-conviction review.56 The Fifth
Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the waiver, reasoning that despite
Rumbaugh's severe depression and mental illness, the district court's
finding of his competency to waive met the stated competency standard. 7
Since Rumbaugh, other states have subsequently embraced this revision
51. Id. at 314.
52. See, e.g., Hauser v. Moore, 223 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam);
Rumbaugh v. Procunier, 753 F.2d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Norman, supra note
12, at 122-23 (discussing the Fifth Circuit's attempt to modify the Rees standard "into a
more manageable inquiry"). A court may determine that a prisoner has a mental disorder
that affects his or her decision-making, and simultaneously that he or she nonetheless has
the ability to appreciate his or her position, and can make a "rational" choice. Id.
Therefore, in Rumbaugh, the Fifth Circuit tried to explain the confusing vocabulary used
in Rees by breaking down the first prong into a more workable three-prong analysis.
Rumbaugh, 753 F.2d at 398. The dissent described the confusion over the term
"rationality" as "one of the most vexing and debated questions of contemporary
philosophy, [and] this black hole makes the Rees standard of competency far from self-
evident." Id. at 404 n.2 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
53. Rumbaugh, 753 F.2d at 398.
54. Id.
55. A "next friend" petition is filed by "[a] person who appears in a lawsuit to act for
the benefit of an incompetent or minor plaintiff, but who is not a party to the lawsuit and
is not appointed as a guardian." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1070 (8th ed. 2004).
56. Rumbaugh, 753 F.2d at 398.
57. Id. at 402-03.
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of the Rees standard when determining an inmate's competency to waive
58his post-conviction review.
In Gilmore v. Utah, the Supreme Court implicitly accepted a standard
of competency described as "a knowing and intelligent waiver."59 After
reviewing the records concerning Gilmore's competency proceedings, the
Court upheld the Utah Supreme Court's finding that he was competent
to waive his appeals.6° Concurring, Chief Justice Burger opined that
Gilmore's mother did not possess next friend standing to assert that her
son was competent, and thus rejected a potential additional safeguard
against executing Gilmore. 6' The strong dissent by Justice Marshall
emphasized the injustice of carrying out the sentence so quickly, thereby
preventing sufficient time for a "mature consideration" of Gilmore's
62competency. Justice White's dissent also argued that a volunteer
cannot consent to be executed and thereby render constitutional an
61otherwise unconstitutional punishment.
58. See, e.g., In re Cockrum, 867 F. Supp. 484, 485 (E.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd on other
grounds, 119 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1997); cf Norman, supra note 12, at 121-22 (stating that
because the United States Supreme Court has not indicated which approach it adopts, the
Court has "left the states with a confusing and conflicting line of cases concerning the
standard to determine a defendant's competency to waive death penalty appeals").
59. 429 U.S. 1012, 1013 (1976) (No. A-453) (miscellaneous order). Gary Gilmore was
convicted of murder and sentenced to death after a trial in Utah on October 7, 1976. Id. at
1012. His mother, Bessie Gilmore, filed a next friend petition on December 2, 1976, to
stay an execution scheduled for four days later. Id. at 1013 (Burger, C.J., concurring). On
December 8, Gary Gilmore filed a response challenging his mother's standing to act on his
behalf. Id. at 1013-14. The case was unique because Gilmore did not request relief, but
instead had "expressly and repeatedly stated since his conviction in the Utah courts that
he had received a fair trial and had been well treated by the Utah authorities." Id. at 1013
n.1. Further, Gilmore's only complaint "ha[d] been with respect to the delay on the part
of the State in carrying out the sentence." Id.
60. Id. at 1013 (miscellaneous order); see also Norman, supra note 12, at 119-20
(noting that the Court found Gilmore competent to waive his post-conviction review
"without even making reference to the 'Rees Standard').
61. Gilmore, 429 U.S. at 1014 (Burger, C.J., concurring). In doing so, the Court
determined that third parties do not have standing to litigate claims on an inmate's behalf
if the condemned inmate is deemed competent to make his own decisions. See id. at 1013
(miscellaneous order).
62. Id. at 1019 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (lamenting that Gilmore was scheduled to be
executed a mere five months after the crime and two months after sentencing, and noting
that this was "hardly sufficient time for mature consideration of the question [of Gilmore's
competence], nor dfid] Gilmore's erratic behavior-from his suicide attempt to his state
habeas petition-evidence such deliberation").
63. Id. at 1018 (White, J., dissenting) ("[T]he consent of a convicted defendant in a
criminal case does not privilege a State to impose a punishment otherwise forbidden by
the Eighth Amendment."). The concerns of the Gilmore dissenters foreshadow Justice
Marshall's 1986 holding in Ford, which interpreted the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
of cruel and unusual punishment as banning the execution of the mentally incompetent.
See id.; id. at 1019 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Both Justices addressed the complexity of the
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In Whitmore v. Arkansas, Jonas Whitmore sought to prevent the
execution of a fellow death-row inmate, Ronald Simmons, by filing a
next friend petition challenging Simmons's competency. 4  The Court
held that to have next friend standing, a third party must show that "the
real party in interest is unable to litigate his own cause due to mental
incapacity"; this requirement is not met when an evidentiary hearing
establishes that the inmate gave a "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary"
waiver and that he had proper access to the courts.65 Accordingly, the
Supreme Court found that to be valid, a waiver of an inmate's right to
pursue post-conviction proceedings must be knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary.66
In Demosthenes v. Baal, the Court reversed a Ninth Circuit decision to
grant a petition for stay of execution filed by Baal's parents. 67 The circuit
court reasoned that the petition offered a minimal basis for granting an
evidentiary hearing to determine Baal's competency to waive his post-
conviction right for review, and remanded the case for further
proceedings.6 The Court's decision implicitly held it sufficient to base a
nexus between waiver of the right to assert post-conviction appeals and the constitutional
ban on executing mentally incompetent inmates. Id. at 1019 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("I
fully agree with my Brother White that a criminal defendant has no power to agree to be
executed under an unconstitutional statute."). Justice Marshall also took exception to the
fact that no adversarial hearing had been held to rebut the state-employed prison
psychiatrist's sole opinion on Gilmore's competency to waive, which was based on a one
hour evaluation and a review of Gilmore's records. Id.
64. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 164 (1990).
65. Id. at 165.
66. Id.
67. Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U.S. 731, 733-34, 737 (1990) (per curiam) (holding that
a state court's determination of competency to waive post-conviction review is binding on
a federal court hearing a habeas corpus petition, and because Baal's parents failed to
establish that he was not competent to waive further proceedings, the federal court lacked
jurisdiction to consider the petition).
Thomas E. Baal was convicted of first degree murder and robbery with use of a deadly
weapon by a Nevada court and sentenced to death. Id. at 732. Prior to Baal's pleading
not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity, "two psychiatrists examined Baal and found
that Baal was competent to stand trial, able to understand right from wrong at the time of
the alleged offense, and disturbed but not psychotic." Id. In an evaluation conducted
after his arraignment and pleading, a third psychiatrist found him competent to stand trial.
Id. When Baal chose to forego his remaining appeals, the state post-conviction court held
an evidentiary hearing where Baal and a psychiatrist testified to his competency, and
based on that evidence, the court determined Baal intelligently waived his right to post-
conviction relief. Id. at 732-33. Baal's parents filed a next friend petition for federal
habeas corpus relief a week later, just hours before Baal's scheduled execution. Id. at 733.
68. Id. at 734. The Supreme Court held that the district court had correctly affirmed
the Nevada Supreme Court's conclusion on Baal's competency to waive, and explicitly
noted that the determination was "'fairly supported by the record,"' and thus binding on a
federal habeas court. Id. at 735 (stating that "under [the] presumption of correctness, the
state court's factual finding as to Baal's competence is binding on a federal habeas court");
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competency-to-waive determination on the testimony of a psychiatrist
who observed the inmate and testified to competency, the determination
of three other psychiatrists as to competency, and the trial court's
conclusion of competency following extensive questioning and
observations of the inmate.69 Additionally, the Court explicitly adopted
the "'knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to proceed"'
formula as the competency-to-waive standard. 70 The Baal holding is the
latest effort by the Supreme Court to develop and expound a specific
competency standard.71
see also Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986) (discussing when a federal
evidentiary hearing is required).
69. Baal, 495 U.S. at 735.
70. Id. at 734 (quoting Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 165).
71. Also in 1990, the Supreme Court passed on the opportunity to identify
constitutional standards for procedures to determine a volunteer's competency to waive
the post-conviction process. See Hamilton ex rel. Smith v. Texas, 497 U.S. 1016, 1016
(1990) (No. A-917) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Four members of the Court would have
granted certiorari, but petition was denied because five votes are required to grant a stay.
Id. at 1016-17. Justices Brennan and Marshall strongly disagreed with the denial of
certiorari, noting the importance to both state and federal courts of articulating specific
procedures for determining competency to waive post-conviction review. Id. at 1019.
Justice Brennan asserted that he "believe[d] that we shirk our responsibility if we do not
articulate standards by which the adequacy of procedures in state competency hearings
may be judged." Id. at 1016.
Three years later in Godinez v. Moran, the Supreme Court, through Justice Thomas,
decided that the standard of competency for pleading guilty or for waiving the right to
counsel is the same as the standard of competency for standing trial. 509 U.S. 389, 391.
The Court held that although states may choose to adopt a more complex competency
standard, all that the Due Process Clause requires is that the defendant "has the capacity
to understand the proceedings and to assist counsel." Id. at 402. This formulation was
derived from Dusky v. United States, in which the Court held that the determination of
competency to stand trial cannot be predicated upon a finding that the defendant is
"'oriented to time and place and [has] some recollection of events,"' but instead the
question is "whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a rational as well as
factual understanding of the proceedings against him." 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per
curiam). In Dusky, the Court remanded the case to the district court for a new hearing on
the defendant's competency to stand trial based on the "doubts and ambiguities regarding
the legal significance of the psychiatric testimony in this case and the resulting difficulties
of retrospectively determining the petitioner's competency as of more than a year ago."
Id. at 403.
The Court's adoption of the Dusky standard in Moran implies that for an inmate to
meet the basic competency standard, he or she must simply have the capacity to
understand the proceedings against him or her and to assist and consult with counsel. See
Moran, 509 U.S. at 402. While not specifically addressing the standard of competency to
waive post-conviction review, the Court, in dicta, acknowledged this waiver, indicating
that it saw no difference between the standards of competency. Id. at 398 n.9 (noting that
the Court has "used the phrase 'rational choice' in describing the competence necessary to
withdraw a certiorari petition, but there is no indication . . . that the phrase means
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C. States' Competency Standards and Specific Procedural Requirements
to Meet Competency Standards
The Supreme Court rulings discussed above have provided states with
a variety of verbiage from which to craft competency standards andS • 72
procedural requirements for such determinations. States were left the
option to adopt the wording of Whitmore, Rees, or Rumbaugh, or a
variation of their own, with the only obligation being to meet the very
basic due process procedural requirements set forth in Ford.73 Below is a
something different from 'rational understanding"' (citing Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312,
314 (1966) (per curiam))).
72. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 427 (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that the states should be
allowed "substantial leeway" to develop their own standards).
73. See Whitmore, 495 U.S. 149; Rees, 384 U.S. 312; Rumbaugh v. Procunier, 753 F.2d
395 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Norman, supra note 12, at 122 ("The states have been left to
choose which standard they consider is best, or to create their own.").
Courts may also adopt other versions of competency standards and procedures. For
example, the American Bar Association (ABA) offers its own standard for incompetence
to be executed, as well as procedures to use upon an initial showing of incompetence:
A convict is incompetent to be executed if, as a result of mental illness or mental
retardation, the convict cannot understand the nature of the pending
proceedings, what he or she was tried for, the reason for the punishment, or the
nature of the punishment. A convict is also incompetent if, as a result of mental
illness of [sic] mental retardation, the convict lacks sufficient capacity to
recognize or understand any fact which might exist which would make the
punishment unjust or unlawful, or lacks the ability to convey such information to
counsel or to the court.
AM. BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 7-5.6 (2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE]. The ABA Standards are persuasive and
frequently cited, though they are not binding. Farringer, supra note 8, at 2452 n.78.
Additionally, the recent ABA Mental Disability Task Force Recommendations urge
states to adopt its model legislation, which would preclude the execution of an inmate with
a mental disorder or disability that significantly impairs his or her capacity (i) to
make a rational decision to forgo or terminate post-conviction proceedings
available to challenge the validity of the conviction or sentence; (ii) to
understand or communicate pertinent information, or otherwise assist counsel, in
relation to specific claims bearing on the validity of the conviction or sentence
that cannot be fairly resolved without the prisoner's participation; or (iii) to
understand the nature and purpose of the punishment, or to appreciate the
reason for its imposition in the prisoner's own case.
Recommendations of the American Bar Association Section of Individual Rights and
Responsibilities Task Force on Mental Disability and the Death Penalty, 54 CATH. U. L.
REV. 1115, 1115 (2005).
The ABA's report, which accompanies the Recommendation, also offers the following
qualification regarding the adoption of procedures designed for incompetent prisoners:
While this [procedure] contemplates that hearings will have to be held to
determine competency to proceed and competency to be executed, it does not
make any recommendations with respect to procedures. Federal constitutional
principles and state law will govern whether the necessary decisions must be
made by a judge or a jury, what burdens and standards of proof apply, and the
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brief explanation of the competency standards and specific procedural
requirements of each of the four states in which a volunteer was executed
in 2006.
1. Montana
Until recently, the Montana Supreme Court had yet to articulate a
standard to determine whether a volunteer has the requisite mental
competency to waive his right to post-conviction review.74 On April 11,
2006, in State v. Dawson, the Montana Supreme Court adopted the
United States Supreme Court's Rees standard for competency to waive."
In adopting the Rees standard, the Montana Supreme Court explicitly
found that the test comported with the state constitution. 6 In addition to
a finding of competency under the Rees standard, the court held that a
separate determination of whether the inmate's waiver was voluntary is
required." The court suggested that conditions of imprisonment may
render an inmate's decision involuntary by causing him to "'abandon his
desire to live."'
78
The Montana Supreme Court also developed certain legal procedures
that would be required in making competency and voluntariness
determinations by referencing the procedures used by the Ninth Circuit
in Dennis v. Budge. ° The Montana Supreme Court acknowledged that
the lower courts, in holding the required evidentiary hearing, have the
discretion to "gather such information and conduct such proceedings as
scope of other rights to be accorded offenders. Additionally, in any proceedings
necessary to make these determinations, the victim's next-of-kin should be
accorded rights recognized by law, which may include the right to be present
during the proceedings, the right to be heard, and the right to confer with the
government's attorney.
Paul M. Igasaki et al., Recommendation and Report on the Death Penalty and Persons with
Mental Disabilities, 30 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 668, 676-77 (2006).
74. State v. Dawson, 133 P.3d 236, 243 (Mont. 2006).
75. Id.; see also discussion infra Part I.D.1. The Montana Supreme Court clarified the
Rees standard by citing to the Rumbaugh three-prong analysis. Dawson, 133 P.3d at 243.
76. Dawson, 133 P.3d at 243 (noting that the standard is "understandable").
77. Id. at 247 (citing Comer v. Stewart, 215 F.3d 910, 917 (9th Cir. 2000)). The
Montana court defined voluntary as being "fully aware of the direct consequences [of
waiver], including the actual value of any commitments made to [the defendant] by the
court, prosecutor, or his own counsel," and that the waiver must "not [have been] induced
by threats or promises to discontinue improper harassment, misrepresentation, or
improper inducements." Id. (citing Duffy v. State, 120 P.3d 398 (2005)).
78. Id. (quoting Comer, 215 F.3d at 918).
79. Id. at 243-44, 247. The questions of competency and voluntariness, while separate
questions, can be evaluated in the same evidentiary hearings or procedures. See id. at 244.
80. Id. at 243 (citing Dennis v. Budge, 378 F.3d 880, 889 (9th Cir. 2004)). In Dennis,
the volunteer had a history of mental illness and suicide attempts, but was still found
competent to waive his post-conviction relief. Dennis, 378 F.3d at 882.
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[would be] necessary and lawful to make the required determinations."'"
In its Dawson decision, the state supreme court implicitly mandated that
a court-appointed psychiatrist examine the inmate, review his records,
interview counsel, and prepare a report for the court!' Additionally the
court found that while a hearing with the inmate present is required, the
psychiatrist is not required to testify, and there is no Montana or federal
law that entitles defense attorneys to cross-examine the state's
psychiatrist witnesses. The court also recognized the importance in
engaging in discussions with the inmate himself during the hearing as
well as reviewing his medical reports."
2. Nevada
In a 1998 volunteer case, the Nevada Supreme Court adopted the Rees
standard as its own standard to determine competency to waive post-
conviction review. 8' The court held that to decide whether a death-row
inmate is competent to forego his remaining post-conviction appeals and
volunteer to be executed, it must be determined that the volunteer "'has
capacity to appreciate his position and make a rational choice with
respect to continuing or abandoning further litigation, or alternatively
whether he is suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect which
may substantially affect his capacity in the premises. ' ''16  The court
further stated that "[a] condemned person is sane if 'aware of his
impending execution and of the reason for it.'"7
The court also held that procedurally, a state trial court is required to
hold a competency hearing to resolve conflicting evidence and make
81. Dawson, 133 P.3d at 244 (reasoning that a lower court judge has the "opportunity
to observe and question a prisoner [and] is not constrained by the cold record and is often
in the best position to judge competency").
82. See id. at 239, 243-44. Although it was the district court that appointed the
psychiatrist, the Montana Supreme Court found this procedure sufficient. See id.
83. Id. at 249 ("There is no requirement under Montana or federal law that an expert
who submits a written report must testify at a hearing to determine a prisoner's
competency in order to make that proceeding adequate."). The court refused to extend
the application of a Montana statute entitling defense counsel to subpoena and cross-
examine psychiatrists or psychologists who report to the court on the defendant's fitness to
proceed in hearings to determine the competency of a defendant to waive his appeals. Id.
84. Id. at 244.
85. Calambro ex reL Calambro v. Second Judicial Dist. Court (Colambro 11), 964 P.2d
794, 800 (Nev. 1998).
86. Id. (quoting Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 314 (1966) (per curiam)).
87. Id. (quoting Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U.S. 731, 733 (1990) (per curiam)). The
Nevada Supreme Court observed that the relevant consideration for determining
competency to waive is not whether the inmate "comprehends post conviction legal issues
in detail or can 'grasp the meaning' of death without resorting to Biblical verses." Id.
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specific written findings regarding the inmate's competency to waive. 8
The state trial court must review the record and the pleadings, as well as
hear testimony."' The state supreme court will then review the lower
court's decision and "will sustain the trial court's findings when
substantial evidence supports them."' In this case, the Nevada Supreme
Court directed the lower court "to appoint independent counsel to
appear on behalf of [the inmate], and to file points and authorities
addressing whether [he] has validly waived appellate review." 91  The
specific points and authorities would then be used as evidence in the final
determination of competency to waive post-conviction review.9
3. Ohio
In a 1997 volunteer case, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the Ohio
Constitution does not prohibit a competent death-row inmate to forego
his right to post-conviction review if he so chooses." The court adopted a
competency-to-waive standard similar to the Rees standard, that is, that
the defendant has "the mental capacity to appreciate his position and to
make a rational choice with respect to continuing or abandoning further
litigation. ,
94
The court offered an example of constitutionally acceptable
procedures that could be implemented for an evaluation and
determination of an inmate's ability to waive post-conviction review and
88. Id.; see also Calambro v. State (Calambro 1), 900 P.2d 340, 343 n.4 (Nev. 1995)
(per curiam). In this particular case, the district court did not enter formal, written
findings concerning the inmate's competency. Calambro 1, 900 P.2d at 343 n.4. The state
supreme court, however, concluded that a remand for the entry of such findings would
serve little purpose under the circumstances because "[tihe record contain[ed] appellant's
canvass and the district court's subsequent oral findings [we]re clear." Id. Instead the
court "reiterate[d] that the district court ha[d] a mandatory duty to enter written findings
regarding competency when a defendant seeks to waive appellate review of a sentence of
death." Id.
89. See Calambro H, 964 P.2d at 800-01 (finding substantial evidence supported the
trial court's findings, where the district court held a hearing during which medical
testimony was given and evidence presented).
90. Id. at 800 (citing Ogden v. State, 615 P.2d 251 (1980)); see also Order Denying
Petition and Dismissing Appeal at 5, Mack ex rel. Mack v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, No.
46306 (Nev. Feb. 3, 2006).
91. Calambro I, 900 P.2d at 343.
92. See id.
93. State v. Berry, 686 N.E.2d 1097, 1107-08 (Ohio 1997) (per curiam). In 1996,
Wilford Berry expressed his decision to waive his remaining appeals challenging his 1990
death sentence for aggravated murder. Id. at 1098.
94. Id. at 1106; see also State v. Berry, 659 N.E.2d 796, 796 (Ohio 1996) (defining the
test as "the mental capacity to understand the choice between life and death and to make
a knowing and intelligent decision not to pursue further remedies").
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volunteer to be executed." Upon remand, the court instructed the trial
court to conduct an evidentiary hearing, which included testimony from
psychiatrists, the State, and the defense, any reports from previously
appointed doctors, and any other relevant evidence or testimony. 96 The
trial court judge was permitted to base the determination of an inmate's
competency to waive on the evidentiary hearing as well as her
conversations with and observations of the inmate.97 The court did not
decide whether observations of and discussions with the inmate are
required in order to make a determination of competency to waive post-
conviction relief.98
4. South Carolina
In 1994, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the standard to
determine competency to waive post-conviction review is the same as the
state's competency-to-be-executed standard. 99  The rigorous South
Carolina two-prong competency-to-waive standard is "whether the
defendant can understand the nature of the proceedings, what he or she
95. See Berry, 686 N.E.2d at 1099 (noting that the Supreme Court of Ohio had earlier
remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of the inmate's competency).
96. Id. In Berry, the lower court heard testimony from two psychiatrists for the state
and two for the defense. Id. Ultimately, after hearing oral arguments, the Ohio Supreme
Court concluded that Berry was competent to waive his remaining appeals. Id. at 1099-
1100. After the hearing, Berry sustained head injuries in a prison riot. Franklin v. Francis,
168 F.3d 261, 261-62 (6th Cir. 1999) (per curiam). Berry's mother and sister filed a
petition for federal habeas relief, moved for a stay of execution, and asked for additional
competency evaluations due to Berry's new head injuries, but the district court denied the
request and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 261.
97. See Berry, 686 N.E.2d at 1099.
98. See id. at 1106.
99. Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d 53, 58, 61-62 (S.C. 1993). Fred Singleton was
"convicted and sentenced to death for murder, burglary, larceny of a motor vehicle, and
first-degree criminal sexual conduct." Id. at 54. The conviction and sentence were
affirmed on appeal in 1985. Id. Singleton filed two petitions for post-conviction review,
the first of which was denied in May 1986. Id. at 54-55. The second petition for post-
conviction review, filed in March 1990, claimed that Singleton was incompetent to be
executed. Id. at 55. The lower court adopted the ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health
Standard for incompetency rather than the standard set forth in Justice Powell's
concurrence in Ford. The State of South Carolina then appealed the decision of the trial
court. Id. at 55; see also STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 73. The South
Carolina Supreme Court adopted a two-prong competency-to-be-executed standard,
which it "slightly modified" from the ABA Standard:
The first prong is the cognitive prong which can be defined as: whether a
convicted defendant can understand the nature of the proceedings, what he or
she was tried for, the reason for the punishment, or the nature of the
punishment. The second prong is the assistance prong which can be defined as:
whether the convicted defendant possesses sufficient capacity or ability to
rationally communicate with counsel.
Singleton, 437 S.E.2d at 58.
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was tried for, the reason for the punishment, and whether the convicted
defendant possesses sufficient capacity or ability to rationally
communicate with counsel."1°° The court explained that the
incompetency standard depends not on whether the condemned actually
cooperates with his attorney, "but whether he has sufficient mental
capacity to do so.' 1°  A failure of either the cognitive prong or the
assistance prong is sufficient grounds to stay an inmate's execution and
deny a motion to waive post-conviction proceedings.c°2
In 2006, the court described the evidence it considers in determining an
inmate's competency, and concluded that the court must
carefully and thoroughly review the appellant's history of
mental competency; the existence and present status of mental
illness or disease suffered by the appellant, if any, as shown in
the record of previous proceedings and in the competency
hearing; the testimony and opinions of mental health experts
who have examined the appellant; the findings of the circuit
court which conducted a competency hearing; the arguments of
counsel; and the appellant's demeanor and personal responses
to our questions at oral argument regarding the waiver of
appellate and PCR [post-conviction relief] rights.1°3
These required considerations allow the South Carolina Supreme
Court, upon review of the lower court's required full evidentiary hearing,
to review a complete record. °4 Upon careful review of prior proceedings
and an in-depth colloquy with the volunteer, the court then determines
whether the inmate is mentally competent and whether his waiver of
post-conviction relief is "knowing and voluntary."1 5
100. State v. Torrence, 451 S.E.2d 883, 884 (S.C. 1994); see also id. at 884 n.2
("Although a capital defendant's waiver of appeal has been upheld upon a showing that
he/she has the capacity to understand the choice between life and death and to knowingly
and intelligently waive any and all rights to appeal his/her sentence, we find the more
stringent standard of Singleton appropriate" (citations omitted)).
101. Id. at 884 n.2; see also Norman, supra note 12, at 127.
102. Hughes v. State, 626 S.E.2d 805, 809 (S.C. 2006). Mar-Reece Aldean Hughes was
convicted in 1995 for the murder of a police officer and sentenced to death. Id. at 807. In
February 2006, the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled that Hughes was incompetent to
waive his right to pursue post-conviction review. Id. at 815. The court found that Hughes
did not understand the nature of the appeal he was waiving and was unable to rationally
communicate with his attorney. Id.
103. Id. at 808.
104. Id.; see also State v. Torrence, 473 S.E.2d 703, 704-05 (S.C. 1996).
105. Torrence, 473 S.E.2d at 705; see also Hughes, 626 S.E.2d at 808-09. The South
Carolina Supreme Court also announced that it is "within [its] discretion" to decide
whether to allow a volunteer to waive his appeals. Hughes, 626 S.E.2d at 809.
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D. Cases of Volunteers Who Met State Standards of Competency and
Were Executed in 2006
1. Montana: David Thomas Dawson
In February 1987, a jury convicted David Thomas Dawson of one
count of robbery and multiple counts each of aggravated kidnapping and
deliberate homicide.' Dawson challenged his convictions through
appeals in state and federal courts, including a petition for writ of
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, but then filed a pro se
motion in the Montana Supreme Court dismissing all appeals and
discharging his appellate counsel in August 2004.07
On remand from the state supreme court, a Montana trial court held a
hearing on Dawson's pro se motion in which the court, the State, and
defense counsel questioned Dawson.'O' Prior to this hearing, the state
trial court reviewed the entirety of Dawson's file, including psychological
reports from two federally-appointed experts, produced for the
simultaneous federal court proceedings1 9 The state trial court
106. State v. Dawson, 133 P.3d 236, 239 (Mont. 2006). Dawson kidnapped and robbed
a family of four at gunpoint, then bound and gagged the victims in his motel room. The
Clark County Prosecuting Attorney, The Death Penalty, David Thomas Dawson,
http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/death/US/dawson1039.htm (last visited Oct. 23,
2007). Two days later, the police rescued Amy, fifteen years old, the only survivor. Id.
Police found Amy's parents and brother strangled to death with a telephone cord. Id.
Dawson was found in the room with them. Id. Dawson received death sentences, one for
each count of deliberate homicide and one for each count of aggravated kidnapping of the
three murder victims. See Dawson, 133 P.3d at 239. Dawson was also sentenced to one
hundred years' imprisonment for the aggravated kidnapping of Amy, and an additional
ten years for the use of a dangerous weapon. Id.
107. Dawson, 133 P.3d at 239. At this time, Dawson, who had previously filed a
habeas petition with the United States District Court for the District of Montana, filed a
motion to dismiss his petition in that court as well. Id. at 239-40.
108. Id. at 240. During his conversations with the court, the judge asked Dawson
about his decision-making process, whether he was motivated by suicidal ideations, and
whether he understood the consequences of his decision. Id. at 245-46. At one point,
Dawson said to the open court that
this is a decision that's been years in the making. And I've looked at every factor
that I possibly can. And I understand the possibilities of what the future might
bring if I were to continue my appeals. That's part of the decision-making. And
I have looked at everything as far as I'm aware of to come up with this decision.
So I am aware of the current law, and I am aware that, very likely, I could get
resentenced. But I don't know that for a fact, I don't know what the future
would bring. But it is part of my decision-making. And at the same time, I have
come up with the decision to stop my appeal.
Id. at 245.
109. Id. at 239-40 (explaining that the Yellowstone County District Court "obtained
and reviewed the reports submitted to the U.S. District Court" and was "familiar with the
entirety of Dawson's file"). One of the two federally-appointed experts was a psychiatrist
and the other was a clinical psychologist. See id. at 239, 243.
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concluded that Dawson was competent and waived his post-conviction
review "knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently."'1 Dawson's counsel
appealed." In State v. Dawson, the Montana Supreme Court held that
the trial court based its determination on more than adequate evidence,
referring to passages of the trial court's discussion with Dawson and the
competency evaluations completed by the "two mental health
professionals.".. 2  The state supreme court affirmed the lower court's
finding of Dawson's competency to waive his post-conviction review,
dismissed the remaining appeals, and remanded for execution of the
judgment."3 David Thomas Dawson was executed by lethal injection on
August 11, 2006 at 12:06 a.m.14
2. Nevada: Daryl Linnie Mack
Daryl Mack was found guilty before a judge, and a three-judge panel
sentenced him to death in May 2002.' In 2003, the Nevada Supreme
Court found that Mack validly waived his right to a jury trial, including
his right to have a jury decide his sentence. 6
In 2005, Mack told Washoe District Judge Robert Perry that he no
longer wished to challenge his death sentence."7 Two subsequent
evidentiary hearings were held to determine Mack's competency to
waive his post-conviction appeals. Two of three psychiatrists who
evaluated Mack found him competent to waive his post-conviction
appeals."' After allowing testimony and reading the reports of three
110. Id. at 240.
111. Id. Dawson's appellate counsel addressed the possible suicidal motivations of
their client, asserting that confinement, lack of proper care for his health problems, and
recent suicides in the prison could have been stressors. Id. at 247.
112. See id. at 240.
113. Id. at 249 ("Dawson is not suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect, he
has the capacity to appreciate his position, he has made a rational choice with respect to
continuing or abandoning further litigation, and his motion to dismiss this appeal is
voluntarily made.").
114. The Clark County Prosecuting Attorney, supra note 106.
115. Mack v. State, 75 P.3d 803, 804-05 (Nev. 2003) (per curiam). See generally The
Clark County Prosecuting Attorney, The Death Penalty, Daryl Linnie Mack,
http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/death/US/mackl019.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2007)
(offering information about death row executions, including a summary of the case, case
citations, and other internet sources and articles written about the case).
116. Mack, 75 P.3d at 804, 807.
117. Id. at 804.
118. See Transcript of Proceedings, Post-Conviction Evidentiary Hearing at 4, Mack v.
State, No. CROO-2225 (Nev. 2d Jud. Dist. Ct. Washoe County July 26, 2005) [hereinafter
July 26 Hearing]; see also Transcript of Proceedings, Post-Conviction Evidentiary Hearing
at 3, Mack, No. CROO-2225 (Oct. 25, 2005) [hereinafter Oct. 25 Hearing].
119. Oct. 25 Hearing, supra note 118, at 9. One psychiatrist had been appointed by the
court. July 26 Hearing, supra note 118, at 7-8.
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psychiatrists, the court found that Mack's waiver was "knowingly,
voluntarily and intelligent[ly]" made, and ordered a warrant of execution
to be written and carried out.'20 Daryl Linnie Mack was executed by
lethal injection on April 26, 2006 at 9:06 p.m.21
3. Ohio
a. Rocky Barton
In one of Ohio's quickest death penalty cases,'22 Rocky Barton was
convicted of aggravated murder on September 29, 2003, and urged jurors
to recommend the death penalty.1 3 On October 10, 2003, Barton was
sentenced to death for one count of aggravated murder.
124
Following one automatic appeal filed on November 20, 2003, the Ohio
Supreme Court upheld Barton's sentence and set an execution date for
January 14, 2004. 12 Barton was determined to go through with the
execution date, but his defense counsel filed a motion for a stay of
120. Order Dismissing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) at 1,
Mack, No. CROO-2225 (Nov. 9, 2005); see also Warrant of Execution at 1, Mack, No.
CROO-2225 (Nov. 9, 2005). Petitioner Daryl Linnie Mack's execution date was halted
when his mother, Viola Mack, as next friend, appealed the dismissal of his application for
a writ to the Nevada Supreme Court. Notice of Appeal at 1, Mack, No. CROO-2225 (Nov.
21, 2005). Due to this petition, the execution of Daryl Linnie Mack was postponed until
April 26, 2006. The Clark County Prosecuting Attorney, supra note 115.
121. The Clark County Prosecuting Attorney, supra note 115.
122. Rocky Barton murdered his fourth wife on January 16,2003. On July 12, 2006, he
was executed. The Clark County Prosecuting Attorney, The Death Penalty, Rocky
Barton, http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/death/US/barton1031.htm (last visited Nov.
19, 2006).
123. State v. Barton, 844 N.E.2d 307, 313-14 (Ohio 2006) (At the penalty phase of the
trial Mr. Barton was quoted as having said: "At this time my attorneys advised me to beg
for my life. I can't do that. I strongly believe in the death penalty. And for the ruthless,
cold-blooded act that I committed, if I was sitting over there, I'd hold out for the death
penalty. * * * I've recently done 10 years in prison. Life in prison would be a burden to all
the citizens of Ohio. It would be at their cost. I wouldn't have nothing to worry about. I'd
get fed every day, have a roof over my head, free medical, you people pay for it, I'd have a
stress-free life. That's not much of a punishment. Punishment would be to wake up every
day and have a date with death. That's the only punishment for this crime. That's all I've
got to say.").
124. Id. at 314. Barton was convicted of "aggravated murder with prior calculation
and design" and a gun charge, which were found to merit the death penalty in light of
Barton's prior convictions for attempted murder and another gun charge. See id. at 309.
Barton shot his wife at close range with a shotgun, in front of his 17-year-old stepdaughter,
and then turned the gun on himself in a failed suicide attempt. Id. at 310, 312.
125. The Supreme Court of Ohio, Case Number 2003-2036, http://www.sconet.state.oh.
us/clerk_of.court/ecms/resultsbycasenumber.asp?type=3&year=2003&number=2036&my
Page=searchbycasenumber%2Easp (last visited Oct. 26, 2007) [hereinafter Barton
Docket].
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execution so that a competency evaluation of Barton could be
undertaken.126
On June 22, 2006, the Ohio Supreme Court remanded the case to the
Warren County Court of Common Pleas for the limited purpose of
holding an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Barton made a
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver, and additionally whether
further psychiatric evaluation was necessary.127 After an evidentiary
hearing where Barton had the opportunity to speak with the court, the
court of common pleas overruled the motion for a psychiatric evaluation,
finding Barton competent to waive further appeals and having "the
mental capacity to understand the choice between life and death.,
128
The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's determination of
competency and upheld the impending execution date.129  The state
supreme court found that the lack of a competency hearing upon
Barton's decision not to offer mitigating evidence was not error.
Furthermore, neither a lack of cooperation with counsel nor an
attempted suicide constituted sufficient indicia of incompetence to raise
questions about Barton's competency and necessitate a hearing.' Rocky
Barton was executed by lethal injection on July 12, 2006 at 10:27 a.m. 3'
126. Appellant Rocky Barton's Motion for an Evaluation to Determine Competency
to Waive Further Direct and Collateral Challenges to His Death Sentence 2, Barton, No.
03-2036 (May 22, 2006).
127. Barton, 849 N.E.2d at 1030. The Ohio Supreme Court instructed the trial court
that where a competency evaluation is deemed necessary, the court should follow specific
statutory instructions regarding the appointment of an examiner, as well as in the conduct
and completion of a psychiatric report. Id.; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. R.C. §
2945.371(A)-(F) (LexisNexis 2006). The court further instructed that if a psychiatric
evaluation were to be ordered, the examiner must follow the State v. Berry test in
evaluating Barton. Barton, 849 N.E.2d at 1030; see also State v. Berry, 659 N.E.2d 796, 796
(Ohio 1996) ("A capital defendant is mentally competent to abandon any and all
challenges to his death sentence... if he has the mental capacity to understand the choice
between life and death and to make a knowing and intelligent decision not to pursue
further remedies." (citations omitted)); The Clark County Prosecuting Attorney, supra
note 122; Barton Docket, supra note 125.
128. The Clark County Prosecuting Attorney, supra note 122. The court noted that in
the evidentiary hearing, nine exhibits were presented and Barton testified, through
questioning by his counsel, the Warren County Prosecutor, and the court. Id. (adding that
Barton was "offered an opportunity to express anything further not covered through
questioning but [that he] indicated he had had the opportunity to say everything he
wanted to say"); see also Barton Docket, supra note 125.
129. State v. Barton, 844 N.E.2d 307 (Ohio 2006).
130. Id. at 316 ("'The right to a hearing rises to the level of a constitutional guarantee
when the record contains sufficient "indicia of incompetency ** *" [sic]."'); see also id. at
317.
131. The Clark County Prosecuting Attorney, supra note 122.
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b. Darrell W. Ferguson
Just a few months after his release from prison, Darrell W. Ferguson
was arrested and indicted for multiple counts of aggravated murder."'
Ferguson waived a jury trial, pled guilty to all charges, waived the
presentation of mitigating evidence, and actively sought the death
penalty.133 Prior to trial, the court sua sponte ordered that Ferguson
undergo a general competency evaluation. 4 After the defense requested
a psychiatrist be appointed as an examiner, the trial court instead
appointed a clinical psychologist to conduct the competency
evaluation. A three-judge panel of the trial court reviewed the
competency evaluation, offered the defense an opportunity to challenge
the evaluation's findings, and twice questioned Ferguson "at length.
136
Based almost entirely on this evidence and the opportunity to observe
Ferguson's behavior and demeanor,3 the trial court ultimately deemed
Ferguson competent to stand trial, waive his right to a jury trial, plead
guilty, and waive mitigation.1 8 Ferguson was sentenced to death for six
aggravated murder charges. "9
On April 24, 2006, Ferguson's attorney filed a motion requesting the
Ohio Supreme Court to reconsider its April 12 ruling that rejected an
additional competency hearing and ultimately affirmed Ferguson's
132. State v. Ferguson, 844 N.E.2d 806, 811 (Ohio 2006). Upon completion of his two-
year term in prison for burglary, Ferguson was required to participate in a substance-abuse
treatment program in Cincinnati. Id. at 809. On December 20, 2001, Ferguson received
permission to visit his mother in Dayton, Ohio for two days, but he never returned to the
program. Id. Instead, Ferguson committed multiple murders. Id. at 809-10.
133. Id. at 812-13. Ferguson was indicted for one count of escape, two counts of
aggravated burglary, one count of robbery, three counts of aggravated robbery, one count
of evidence tampering, and six counts of aggravated murder. Id. at 812. In a January 7,
2003 letter, Ferguson wrote to the trial judge, "'[I] * * * is asking you in my right state of
mind would you please Find it in good will to give me the Death penalty."' Id. (alteration
in original).
134. Id. at 813.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 817. The competency evaluation by the clinical psychologist was conducted
over a period of nine-and-a-half hours over five days. Id. at 815.
137. Id. at 816-17.
138. Id. at 817.
139. Id. at 813. The six aggravated murder charges
each contained five identical death-penalty specifications: murder to escape
detection or apprehension; murder while at large after breaking detention;
murder as a "course of conduct" in killing two or more people; murder while
committing or attempting to commit aggravated burglary; and murder while
committing or attempting to commit aggravated robbery.
Id. at 812 (internal citations omitted).
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conviction and death sentence.' 4° The court denied the motion to
reconsider on June 7, 2006 and set an execution date of August 8, 2006.4
Other than the evaluation of the clinical psychologist and the
determination of the defense psychiatrist that more testing was needed,
both of which occurred prior to sentencing, there was no separate testing
or hearing to determine Ferguson's competency to waive post-conviction
142
appeals. Darrell Wayne Ferguson was executed by lethal injection on
August 8, 2006 at 10:21 a.m."'
4. South Carolina: William E. Downs, Jr.
William Downs pled guilty to the kidnapping, rape, and murder of a
six-year old boy in 2002.'4 Before he was sentenced to death, Downs
requested the death penalty, telling the circuit judge that he believed he
deserved to die for his crime.
After Downs' conviction and death sentence were affirmed on direct
appeal, Downs requested that he be allowed to waive his right to post-
conviction relief and be executed.' 46 The South Carolina Supreme Court
remanded the case to the trial court for a competency hearing. 47 At the
first evidentiary hearing, in February 2005, the trial judge granted the
defense counsel's motion, and ruled that the State could offer the
140. Motion for Reconsideration at 1, State v. Ferguson, 848 N.E.2d 859 (Ohio 2006)
No. 03-1904. In its earlier decision, the court determined that because the defense
stipulated that the court-appointed psychologist "'would be qualified as an expert and she
would testify in accordance with her report,"' the defense made a strategic decision to
forego the opportunity to cross-examine the psychologist and present its own testimony.
Ferguson, 844 N.E.2d at 819. On appeal, Ferguson's attorney argued that the court's
decision, based on the availability of the defense psychiatrist to testify and the defense's
failure to call him, was erroneous because the defense psychiatrist never expressed a
psychiatric opinion. Motion for Reconsideration, supra, at 2. Instead, the defense
psychiatrist only testified to the need for further testing, and thus was unavailable to
testify to Ferguson's competency. Id.
141. Reconsideration Entry at 1, Ferguson, 848 N.E.2d 859 (No. 03-1904).
142. See Ferguson, 844 N.E.2d at 814-15.
143. The Clark County Prosecuting Attorney, The Death Penalty, Darrell Wayne
Ferguson, http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/death[US/ferguson1038.htm (last visited
Oct. 23, 2007).
144. State v. Downs, 604 S.E.2d 377, 378 (S.C. 2004). In 2005, Downs also pled guilty
to having kidnapped, raped, and killed a 10-year-old boy in Augusta, South Carolina in
1991. The Clark County Prosecuting Attorney, The Death Penalty, William E. Downs, Jr.,
http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/death/US/downs1032.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2006).
Since he was already sentenced to death in South Carolina, Downs received an additional
two consecutive life sentences, plus ten years. Id.
145. The Clark County Prosecuting Attorney, supra note 144 (quoting Downs as
saying, "I think it would be disrespectful to the family and disrespectful to the whole world
if you did not give me the death penalty").
146. State v. Downs, 631 S.E.2d 79, 80 (S.C. 2006).
147. Id. at 81.
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testimony of its two psychiatric experts and the defense would be allowed
to cross-examine those doctors at a later date. A second hearing was
held one month later.'4 9 During these hearings, three experts testified
that Downs was mildly depressed, but that he was still competent under
both prongs of the state's competency-to-waive standard."5 One defense
psychiatrist maintained she needed more time to evaluate Downs before
offering an opinion; Downs' trial attorney testified to his competency."'
Upon hearing the expert testimony and speaking with Downs,' the
trial judge found Downs competent to waive his appeals and be executed
under the Singleton standard.'53 Upon review, the South Carolina
Supreme Court found that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in
denying the motion for a continuance and affirmed the lower court's
findings that Downs was competent to waive his post-conviction appeals
and that his waiver was knowing and voluntary.5 4 William E. Downs, Jr.
was executed by lethal injection on July 14, 2006 at 6:17 p.m. 5 5
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See id. at 84.
151. Id. at 84-85. The defense psychiatrist wanted more time to evaluate and treat
Downs to determine whether he met the criteria for major depressive disorder. Id. The
defense attorney also testified that while he thought Downs had "significant mental health
issues and ... was depressed," he felt that at the time he worked with Downs, Downs was
"competent to stand trial and had the ability to rationally communicate with him," and
had not changed much since. Id. at 82-83.
152. Id. at 83. During the hearing, Downs disagreed with the ability of the psychiatric
or psychological experts to render a diagnosis because of the short amount of time they
spent with him. Transcript of Record at 271-72, Downs, 631 S.E.2d 79 (Nos. 1999-GS-02-
1230, -1231, -1232) [hereinafter March 2005 Competency Hearing]. Downs ended his
dialogue with the court by requesting "that if it is proven that I am competent, which I
believe it will be, [to] impose an injunction upon [Downs' counsel] to not file anymore [sic]
motions or anything in my case, [because] I will be firing him." Id. at 273.
153. Downs, 631 S.E.2d at 81, 84; see supra note 99 (setting forth the Singleton
standard). The trial judge "specifically found [Downs] did not have a present wish to
commit suicide or die," but that he simply had maintained throughout the proceedings
that he would "prefer[] death to being locked up for the rest of his life." Downs, 631
S.E.2d at 84. In closing the competency hearing, the trial judge said to Downs that it had
"been a pleasure to get to know [him] from this distance as a trial judge" throughout the
proceedings, and that Downs had been "one of the most courteous, attentive, and, I think,
competent defendants I've ever had the opportunity to observe since I've been on the
bench." March 2005 Competency Hearing, supra note 152, at 277.
154. Downs, 631 S.E.2d at 85.
155. The Clark County Prosecuting Attorney, supra note 144.
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II. AN EVALUATION OF STATE PROCEDURES FOR IMPLEMENTING
COMPETENCY STANDARDS
The Supreme Court in Ford noted that the determination of
competency as a prerequisite to a constitutional execution requires "no
less stringent standards than those demanded in any other aspect of a
capital proceeding."' Arguably, these stringent standards are necessary
not only in determining whether a volunteer meets the standard of
competency to be executed, but also in evaluating the volunteer's
competency to waive post-conviction review.'57
A. The Baseline Model of Procedures Necessary to Ensure an Inmate's
Competency to Waive Post-Conviction Relief
Most legal scholars who have proposed model competency evaluations
have focused on the standard of competency to be executed and the1 . .• 158
procedures involved in that determination. When analyzing state
procedures used to implement standards of competency to waive, five
basic requirements emerge from the literature that ensure an adequate
determination of volunteer incompetency to waive post-conviction relief
rights. These five requirements are an extension of the three minimal
procedures set forth in Ford, which simply require the presentation of
relevant material so the court can make an informed decision, an
opportunity for defense counsel or the inmate to challenge or impeach
state-appointed psychiatrists' opinions, and assurances that the final
decision is not left solely to the executive branch 9
The first basic procedure that should be required in every state to
ensure the correctness of the competency determination is that at least
one neutral evaluator, such as a court-appointed psychiatrist, must
156. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411-12 (1986).
157. See, e.g., Blume, supra note 3, at 943 (advocating for a more thorough standard
for competency to waive post-conviction review that considers "the prevalence of suicidal
motivation among volunteers" to ensure the mentally incompetent are not executed).
158. See, e.g., Ebert, supra note 10, at 35 (arguing that courts must "recognize all
contributors to incompetency"); Norman, supra note 12, at 118 (emphasizing the need to
avoid "an 'arbitrary' or 'capricious' execution"); cf Blume, supra note 3, at 959 (observing
that it is difficult to compare volunteer rates to general suicide rates). But see Richard J.
Bonnie, Mentally Ill Prisoners on Death Row: Unsolved Puzzles for Courts and
Legislatures, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1169, 1173-74 & nn.27-29 (2005) (suggesting that
reasonable procedures already exist (citing Coe v. Bell, 209 F.3d 815, 818-20 (6th Cir.
2000); ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-5.7(a)-(d) (1988)).
See generally Phyllis L. Crocker, Not to Decide Is to Decide: The U.S. Supreme Court's
Thirty-Year Struggle with One Case About Competency to Waive Death Penalty Appeals,
49 WAYNE L. REV. 885 (2004) (discussing Rees).
159. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 414-16.
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conduct an independent evaluation of the inmate.'6 The neutral
evaluator would be required in addition to state and defense psychiatrists
or psychologists, because both the state and the defense should have the
right to introduce their own evidence and reports.16' An optimal
evaluation would be conducted, however, by an entire panel of neutral
psychiatric or psychological evaluators, which would ensure that the
evaluations are presented to the fact-finder in an unbiased and thorough
162
manner.
A second basic procedure that should be required is specific
psychological and intelligence testing of the inmate, conducted by the
neutral evaluator(s).' These tests would provide clinical and empirical
evidence specifically for the purpose of determining whether the
volunteer meets the state's standard of competency to waive post-
conviction relief.'6
The third baseline procedure for implementing a state's competency-
to-waive standard is thorough evaluations, which specifically include
exploration of the particular motivations behind the inmate's reason for
volunteering to be executed. A thorough investigation will ideally be
conducted by the neutral evaluator(s) and include the examination of the
160. See id. at 417 ("Also essential is that the manner of selecting and using the experts
responsible for producing that 'evidence' must be conducive to the formation of neutral,
sound, and professional judgments as to the prisoner's ability to comprehend the nature of
the penalty.").
161. Cf Hamilton v. Texas, 497 U.S. 1016, 1019 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(noting the circumstances in which federal habeas proceedings are required because state
procedures were inadequate); Ford, 477 U.S. at 416-17 (maintaining that there should be
at least the minimal basic due process requirements).
162. Interview with Lindsay Glauner, former Senior Project Attorney, Am. Bar Ass'n
Death Penalty Moratorium Implementation Project, in Wash., D.C. (Nov. 3, 2006).
163. See Ebert, supra note 10, at 48-49 (including as an element of a thorough
competency evaluation both psychological and intelligence testing). Ebert offers a table
of psychological tests and their specific uses. See id. at 53-55 tbl.1. The table presents
numerous tests for fifteen conditions that should be considered when evaluating an
inmate's competency to waive, including: intellectual deficits, memory problems,
personality disorders, personality functioning, interpersonal relations, depression, suicide,
alcohol problems, schizophrenia, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, bipolar disorder, anxiety
disorder, adjustment disorders, psychosomatic disorders, and neuropsychological
problems. Id.
164. See id. at 36-43 (discussing the need for standards and how to find them).
165. See Igasaki et al., supra note 73, at 673. Igasaki's proposal for creating a more
thorough evaluation of competency to waive post-conviction relief emphasizes that "[a]ny
meaningful competence inquiry in this context [of volunteers] must focus not only on the
prisoner's understanding of the consequences of the decision, but also on his or her
reasons for wanting to surrender, and on the rationality of the prisoner's thinking and
reasoning." Id.
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inmate's personal belongings,' 66 past medical records, education, and
relationship history.
167
The fourth procedure that should be required in every state is the
implementation of lengthy interviews conducted over an extended period
of time with both the inmate and his close contacts.' 6' These contacts
include family, friends, past and present attorneys, correctional officers,
and other persons whom the inmate comes into contact with on a
relatively consistent basis.' 69 The interviews with the inmate and his
contacts should be conducted by the neutral psychiatrist, and
memorialized in written reports that are submitted to the court to ensure
that all available information to make an educated decision is
presented.17 The court also should be required to have its own dialogue
with the inmate, in which the court interacts with the inmate and poses
specific questions regarding the inmate's competency.171
Finally, the fifth procedural requirement should be that the trial court
must hold an evidentiary hearing, separate from any other hearing
conducted by the trial court or district court, for the purpose of
specifically evaluating the inmate's competency to waive post-conviction
review under the state standard.17 The lower court's hearing allows the
state's highest court to review the lower court's finding of fact, and
determine whether the correct procedures were followed and standards
were applied.173  This would "ensure[] that at least two independent
166. Ebert, supra note 10, at 49 (proposing that a review of the inmate's records and
documents would include, without limitation, any videotapes of the inmate, art work by
the inmate, records or transcripts, and recent writings or letters by the inmate). Ebert
proposes a thorough model instrument to determine competency to be executed,
emphasizing the need for many forms of reliable testing in order to ensure the states do
not execute the presently insane. See id.
167. Id. 47-50. Ebert suggests that for a proper determination of competency to be
executed, the decision must be based on a complete background history on fourteen
topics, including relationship history, medical and psychological records, drug and alcohol
abuse, and family history. Id. at 47-48. He also articulates the need for the utilization of a
"specific clinical instrument" to be used in conjunction with the above components. Id. at
50.
168. Id. at 50 n.156 (suggesting that one element of a thorough competency evaluation
would include interviews with friends, family and other contacts to compare with objective
sources of information).
169. Id.
170. See id. at 50 (discussing how collateral contacts can provide key information that
could be useful).
171. Norman, supra note 12, at 133 (arguing that in order for a trial judge to correctly
determine a volunteer's competency to waive post-conviction review, "the trial judge
should conduct a 'probing inquiry"' with the volunteer) (citing Rumbaugh v. Procunier,
753 F.2d 395, 412 (5th Cir. 1985) (Goldberg, J., dissenting)).
172. Id. at 132.
173. Id.
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bodies review" the inmate's competency to waive post-conviction
appeals.
1 4
B. State Procedures Within Specific 2006 Cases: Are the States Meeting
the Minimum Proposed Requirements?
1. Montana
In Dawson, the State of Montana did not appoint neutral evaluators
because the federal court had already appointed two neutral experts.75
These circumstances make it impossible to determine whether Montana
met the first required guideline. Despite the lack of state-appointed
neutral evaluators, the Montana Supreme Court based its decision on the
two neutral experts who conducted psychological testing to develop their
forty-page forensic psychiatric evaluation and ten-page psychological
evaluation.176 Therefore Montana arguably met the second suggested
procedure.
The State of Montana also met both the third and fourth suggested
procedures. The experts' evaluation included lengthy "interviews with
Dawson's attorneys, mother, and a long-time friend," review of
"extensive collateral material," and clinical interviews and psychological
testing. 77  Interviews with Dawson by the court, the experts, and his
attorneys delved into the motivations behind Dawson's decision to waive
his appeals.7 Moreover, the state trial court held a hearing to determine
whether Dawson was competent under the state's competency-to-waive
standard. As a result, Montana met the fifth recommended procedure.
2. Nevada
In Mack, the State of Nevada appointed three neutral psychiatrists to
examine and interview Darryl Linnie Mack, in addition to the
psychiatrists who had previously met with Mack to determine his
competency to waive his post-conviction relief. '° The appointment of
174. Id.
175. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
176. State v. Dawson, 133 P.3d 236, 243-44 (Mont. 2006) ("[P]ychological testing
revealed no basis for a specific personality disorder diagnosis ... no[r any] evidence of
mental illness, psychosis, significant mood disorder or oranicity, either presently or
historically.").
177. Id. at 244.
178. Id. at 241-42, 245-48.
179. See discussion supra Part I.D.1.
180. Order Denying Petition and Dismissing Appeal at 2-3, Mack v. State, No. 46306
(Nev. Feb. 3, 2006) (stating that two psychiatrists examined Mack pursuant to a court
order). Subsequently, the district court ordered a third psychiatrist to evaluate Mack. Id.
at 3; see also Transcript of Proceedings, Post-Conviction Oral Arguments at 10, Mack, No.
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three evaluators indicates that Nevada met the first required basic
procedure, ensuring that the evaluations of Mack were presented to the
fact-finder in an unbiased, thorough manner. However, Nevada did not
met the second requirement when the three court-appointed psychiatrists
failed to perform specific psychological and intelligence testing to
determine whether Mack met the state's competency-to-waive
standard."'
Nevada met the third basic requirement of thorough evaluations
despite the fact that none of the court-appointed psychiatrists
administered DSM-accepted testing.'u The transcripts of the
proceedings and other court documents indicate that all three
psychiatrists consulted few sources in completing Mack's competency-to-
waive evaluation, including his prison medical and psychiatric records, asS 183
well as "extensive" interviews with the inmate. However, they could
have consulted additional factors-such as Mack's education and
relationship history, as well as his personal belongings-for a more
thorough evaluation.&
Nevada met the fourth requirement because the courts held multiple
evidentiary hearings, and gave Mack the opportunity to speak with the
court to express his thoughts on waiving his post-conviction appeals and
going forward with the execution.'85 Finally, Nevada met the fifth
required procedure because the trial court held not one but two
evidentiary hearings,186 both reviewed by the Nevada Supreme Court.
Furthermore, the Nevada Supreme Court noted that "[a]s for the
adequacy of the evidentiary hearing, the district court did not limit
Mack's counsel's presentation of evidence."'8 7
CROO-2225 (Nev. 2d Jud. Dist. Ct. Washoe County May 11, 2005) (mentioning that the
evaluators were agreed to by the court, the State and the defense).
181. See Order Denying Petition and Dismissing Appeal, supra note 180, at 4-6
(discussing a letter from a psychologist faulting the evaluations of the three court-
appointed psychiatrists because they did not "administer[] psychological tests to ascertain
whether Mack was minimizing psychopathology").
182. DSM refers to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, which
is published by the American Psychiatric Association and covers all mental health
disorders for both children and adults. It also lists known causes of these disorders,
statistics in terms of gender, age at onset, and prognosis as well as some research
concerning the optimal treatment approaches.
183. Order Denying Petition and Dismissing Appeal, supra note 180, at 3, 6.
184. See supra note 166-67 and accompanying text.
185. See generally sources cited supra note 118.
186. See generally sources cited supra note 118.
187. Order Denying Petition and Dismissing Appeal, supra note 180, at 6.
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3. Ohio
Ohio's two cases illustrate the need for specific required procedures,
based on the arbitrary nature in which they were applied in one case but
not the other. In Ferguson, the volunteer was examined by a court-
appointed psychologist at the request of defense counsel.91  In Barton,
the defense counsel's retained psychologist interviewed Barton for
several hours prior to trial, but neither he nor defense counsel ever raisedS 189
the issue of competency. Furthermore, no neutral evaluator was
appointed to evaluate Barton; in fact, the State convinced the court that
no competency evaluation was needed.' 9° The Barton case illustrates that
Ohio failed the first required procedure, and further demonstrates the
need for these procedures to be carried out uniformly in every case.191
The consequence of allowing disparate application of these procedures is
quite grave- the execution of incompetent inmates.
As for the second required procedure, the occurrence of specific
psychological and intelligence testing, Ohio arguably met this baseline
requirement in Ferguson by ordering a psychologist's competency
evaluation, but did not with respect to Barton.192 With respect to the
third procedure, thorough evaluations, Ohio blatantly failed to meet this
prong in Barton since no evaluation of Barton occurred. 93 Ohio also
failed to meet the fourth recommendation for lengthy interviews both by
the court and an evaluator. In Ferguson, there was no "neutral" expert 94
and no interviews with contacts, while in Barton, there was no "lengthy"
interview of the volunteer with a neutral evaluator at all, let alone with
his contacts. 19' However, Ohio did meet the second prong of this
recommendation because in both cases, the volunteers had ample
opportunity to address the courts.
Ohio did not meet the final required baseline procedure of holding an
independent competency hearing in the trial court. In neither Ferguson
nor Barton did the courts hold separate hearings specifically evaluating
the inmates to determine whether they met the standard of competency
188. State v. Ferguson, 844 N.E.2d 806, 813 (Ohio 2006).
189. State v. Barton, 844 N.E.2d 307, 317 (Ohio 2006).
190. See supra text accompanying notes 127-28.
191. See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
192. See discussion supra Part I.D.3.
193. See supra text accompanying note 128.
194. See State v. Ferguson, 844 N.E.2d 806, 815 (Ohio 2006) (reporting that the court-
appointed state psychologist interviewed Ferguson for nine-and-a-half hours over five
days).
195. See State v. Barton, 844 N.E.2d 307, 317 (Ohio 2006) (referencing an interview
with a defense-retained psychologist, but not a neutral evaluator); see supra text
accompanying note 128.
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to waive.' 96 In Ohio, if a defendant had been evaluated during earlier
stages in the case, or if no "'indicia of incompetency' were shown, there
is no subsequent requirement to hold a hearing to determine competency
to waive.' 97 Therefore, Ohio failed to meet the fifth recommended
procedure.
4. South Carolina
In Downs, although the court appointed two of the evaluators, the
court specifically referred to them as "State experts," and they testified
for the State.' 98 Since there was no indication of neutrality in these
psychologists, arguably South Carolina did not meet the first proposed
requirement in this case.
The South Carolina Supreme Court noted in Downs that the state
experts "administered several psychological tests" during the second of
two meetings to determine his competency to waive under the Singleton
standard. 99 In fact, the experts administered four psychological tests and,
based on the results, concluded that Downs showed no evidence of major
psychiatric or cognitive dysfunction' ° Although these psychological
tests were not conducted by "neutral" evaluators, and there were no
intellectual tests administered, the psychiatric evaluation reports were
sufficient to meet the second procedural requirement.
Regarding the third requirement, the experts' reports indicated that
several sources of information were consulted in the competency-to-
waive evaluation, including correctional facility records, appellate
transcripts, and reports and transcripts from previous competency
evaluations.20' Therefore, South Carolina met this requirement.
196. See Ferguson, 844 N.E.2d at 813; Barton, 844 N.E.2d at 316.
197. See Barton, 844 N.E.2d at 316 (citation omitted).
198. See State v. Downs, 631 S.E.2d 79, 82, 85 (S.C. 2006).
199. Id. at 81-82 (noting that both State experts evaluated Downs under the Singleton
standard and found him competent under both the cognitive and assistance prongs of the
test).
200. E.g., Pamela M. Crawford & Jeffrey E. Musick, Psychiatric Evaluation of William
Ernest Downs, Jr. at 2 (Feb. 23, 2005) (on file with author) [hereinafter Psychiatric
Evaluation]. The report states:
Mr. Downs was given four psychological tests; the Test of Memory Malingering;
the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI); the Repeatable Battery
for the Assessment of Neuropsychological Status; and the Personality
Assessment Inventory (PAl). Based on the testing performed there is no
evidence of a major psychiatric impairment at this time. There is also no
evidence o[f] significant deficits in cognition and [sic] overall intellectual
functioning.
Id.
201. Psychiatric Evaluation, supra note 200, at 1 (stating that the sources of
information for the report included the court order mending the competency evaluation,
[Vol. 57:567
2008] Are Mentally Incompetent Inmates Volunteering to Die? 601
Transcripts of the evidentiary hearings as well as the psychiatric
opinions illustrate that the State met the fourth requirement because
Downs had the opportunity to answer questions and make a prolonged
statement to the court about his competency and desire to go forward
with execution.2 2 Additionally, the trial court met the fifth
recommended procedure by holding not one but two evidentiary
hearings, which were both reviewed by the South Carolina Supreme
Court.2 °3
III. THE STATES' IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMPETENCY-TO-WAIVE
STANDARDS CREATES A GREATER LIKELIHOOD THAT INCOMPETENT
INMATES ARE STILL BEING EXECUTED
Certain states, such as South Carolina, may implement adequate
procedures to determine an inmate's competency to waive post-
conviction relief. However, the lack of explicit nationwide regulations
delineating the steps required in making competency determinations
makes it unlikely that adequate procedures will be followed in every
case. Montana's procedures to determine competency to waive post-
conviction review are seemingly adequate, but it is important to note that
the Dawson case was the first case in which the Montana Supreme Court
addressed the issue of a competency-to-waive standard.2 4 The Montana
Supreme Court simply remanded the case with instructions to the lower
court to employ certain procedures it decided were sufficient to ensure a
correct determination in this case. There is no indication that the
Montana courts will hold future cases to the same standards and
requirements or if the Montana Supreme Court will adopt specific
procedures in the future. The different procedures undertaken in the
two previously discussed Ohio cases illustrate the discrepancies in
the appellate transcript in Downs' case, prison records, records from a psychiatric
institute, the result of psychological testing conducted on February 17, 2005, and "[c]linical
forensic interviews" with Downs conducted on February 11 and 17, 2005). The
supplemental materials included previous psychological reports which were based on
letters written by Downs, statements of Downs' family and friends, police reports, court
records, and other psychological testing of Downs. Id. at supplement; see also supra note
200 (describing specific tests performed by psychiatrists that the court relied upon).
202. See March 2005 Competency Hearing, supra note 152, at 8, 271, 273-74. The court
acknowledged the testimony of the experts, attorneys, and Downs, noted that Downs'
testimony indicated that his motivations were not suicidal, and then concluded that Downs
was, "in fact, competent and that he's met the test of Singleton." Id. at 276 ("It's not so
much that Mr. Downs is saying, I want to die; he's saying I don't want to spend the rest of
my life locked up.").
203. See supra notes 147-54 and accompanying text.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 74-76.
205. See State v. Dawson, 133 P.3d 236, 249 (Mont. 2006).
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implementation that will occur without specific, required procedures to
206determine competency.
The state standards discussed above do not exemplify sufficient
procedures. Several states do not even implement, let alone require,
specific procedures such as allowing the defense attorney the opportunity
to cross-examine the state psychiatric evaluators and requiring minimal
time frames to evaluate the inmates.207  This is unacceptable in death
penalty cases, because they exact the most severe punishment.2°8 Given
that death penalty cases are different based on the severity of the
punishment, it is imperative that an evidentiary hearing to determine
competency to waive post-conviction appeals be held separate and apart
from the evidentiary hearings held to determine the mental capability of
defendants to waive jury trials, mitigating evidence, or counsel.209 One
argument against this safeguard, which does not hold up to scrutiny, is
that the procedure would be an unnecessary expenditure of judicial,
state, and defense resources.210 States spend millions of dollars each year
on death-row inmates' appeals, housing, and other important issues 211 If
206. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
207. See discussion supra Part II.B.
208. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (5-4 decision) ("Because the
death penalty is the most severe punishment, the Eighth Amendment applies to it with
special force. Capital punishment must be limited to those offenders who commit 'a
narrow category of the most serious crimes' and whose extreme culpability makes them
'the most deserving of execution."' (citations omitted)).
209. See supra text accompanying notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 21.
211. See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY 4
(2007), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/FactSheet.pdf (stating financial facts about the
death penalty). The Death Penalty Information Center's pamphlet illustrates the extreme
total costs of the death penalty:
- The California death penalty system costs taxpayers $114 million per year
beyond the costs of keeping convicts locked up for life. Taxpayers have paid
more than $250 million for each of the state's executions.
- In Kansas, the costs of capital cases are 70% more expensive than comparable
non-capital cases, including the costs of incarceration.
- In Indiana, the total costs of the death penalty exceed the complete costs of life
without parole sentences by about 38%, assuming that 20% of death sentences
are overturned and reduced to life.
- The most comprehensive study in the country found that the death penalty
costs North Carolina $2.16 million per execution over the costs of sentencing
murderers to life imprisonment. The majority of those costs occur at the trial
level.
- Enforcing the death penalty costs Florida $51 million a year above what it
would cost to punish all first-degree murderers with life in prison without parole.
Based on the 44 executions Florida had carried out since 1976, that amounts to a
cost of $24 million for each execution.
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a state compares the costs of accepting a waiver and executing a possibly
incompetent or insane inmate, it will find that it would be more costly to
112
execute, than to ensure a mistake in competency is not made.
However, the cost is irrelevant because the Constitution requires that
states cannot execute incompetent or insane inmates. 3
Without uniform and explicit procedures to determine competency to
waive, courts can arbitrarily choose which cases need competency
hearings without any foundation to support the decision.1 Without
holding any evidentiary hearing, courts will not have any information
regarding the inmate's psychological or intelligence history or other
background information necessary to determine whether further
competency testing should be held. This process could increase the
chance that courts will decide to execute incompetent inmates. The
procedural safeguards vary too much to guarantee that in all four states,
the next volunteer will not be executed if he or she is incompetent. 215 As
seen in the case studies discussed in this Comment, twenty years after the
Supreme Court explicitly decided that it is unconstitutional to execute
216the incompetent, there remain serious gaps in state procedures.
Therefore, explicitly required standards which specifically articulate the
required procedures are necessary.
IV. CONCLUSION
While the states examined in this Comment are doing a more thorough
evaluation of a volunteer's competency to waive his post-conviction
appeals, the lack of uniform, specific procedures creates the possibility
that a mentally ill or suicidal inmate could be executed under the
procedures of one state but not another, despite Constitutional
requirements. Courts should have to adhere to detailed and uniform
requirements in competency evaluations, like those proposed in Part II,
prior to discontinuing the appeals and executing the condemned.
Regardless of additional safeguards in place, after a determination of
competency to waive is made, states should be required to uphold the
constitutional prohibition against executing the incompetent at every
- In Texas, a death penalty case costs an average of $2.3 million, about three
times the cost of imprisoning someone in a single cell at the highest security level
for 40 years.
Id. (citations omitted).
212. See id.
213. See supra text accompanying note 8.
214. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
215. See supra Part I.C.
216. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); see also supra notes 8-12 and
accompanying text.
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possible level. This requires death penalty states to uniformly adopt
minimum procedures to ensure that incompetent inmates are not being
executed.
